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Introduction 
Spanish foreign policy has had traditionally two main orientations (leaving 
aside USA which may be the most important from the point of view of 
realpolitik): Europe, because of historieal eoexistenee, and Ameriea, because of 
the "discovery, eonquest, and eolonisation", and the eomplex relationships whieh 
they brought about. Both are central ingredients of Spanish identity, eíther as a 
natíon or as a Nation State. Given the simultaneous belongingness to these two 
worlds, one can think of a possible conflict of identifications and interests, if an 
exclusive commitment to any of these had to be made. 
In the context of increasing "Europeanisation", the position of the Latin­
Americans as a referent group for Spanish people becomes worthy of 
investigation. Is there any specifically differentiated feeling of attachment, or 
community, with the Latin-Americans among the Spaniards? Is there still a 
belief or a feeling that there exists a cultural andJor psychological affinity with. 
or belongingness to, a symbolic community beyond Spain itself? Are there any 
psychological bases for the 50 caBed "Iberoamerican Community of 
Nations"? 
This chapter draws on 5urvey data to explore the extent to which this dual 
orientation is reflected in Spanish public opinion and to discuss its character­
istics. 1 shall consider data from three different surveys within a briefly sketched 
sociohistorical context. TINo of the surveys involve a representative sample of 
1200 Spanish people aged 18 and aboye and they took place in January 1991 and 
January 1992. The sample of the third survey comprised 100 people from each 
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of scven professional groups: writers, University professors, clergymen, 
managers, joumalists, liberal professions (medical doctors, lawyers and engi­
neers) and politicians. The sample was drawn from respective groups in Madrid 
(243), Barcelona (224), Seville (80), Valencia (76), Bilbao (76) and La Coruna 
(56). This survey was conducted in the autumn of 1992. 
Europe as an Aspiration 
By the turn of the twentieth century Spanish society was living through a 
period of a deep social crisis, starting with the Napoleonic invasion, the traumatic 
war with the United States and the loss of its last colonies in 1898. This year was 
called the year of "National Disaster". 
In this context of generaliscd pessimism a current of thought known as 
regeneracionismo, a main proponent of which is Joaquin Costa, defended the 
idea that Spain should look to Europe and assimilate its values and palterns of 
social organisation in order to come out of its decadencc. It should stop searching 
for its "national essences" in an idealised past and look towards its current 
European environment. 
This point was laken over by Jose Ortega y Gasset who may be considered as 
the central figure of twentieth century Spanish thought. Mirroring that collective 
mood, in 1911 Ortega said: 
To be Spanish is certainly a painful destiny ... Spain does not exisl as a nation ... Rcgeneration 
is inseparable of Europeanization; that's why immediately after Ihe reconstructive emotion was 
fell that Europeanization idea came 10 mind. Regeneration is (he wish, Europeanization is the 
means to satisfy il. It was truly seen from the beginning thal Spain was Ihe problem and Europe 
Ihe solution. 
(Ortega, 1989, 19) 
And a liule before in the same text: 
Ihe comparative perception of the splendid 
Europcan possibilily ... To grieve for ís Ihe will lo become Europe. 
(Ortega, 1989, 18) 
To feel the dístressing Spanish 
A literal interpretation of this text would certainly be misleading. It is not the 
mimetic spirit, but that of emulation, stimulation. It is not a question of 
abandoning a historical identity in order to copy another one. Rather it is to 
recognise the open character of it and, in spite of its serious situation, to 
undertake creatively its reconstruction in view of the values represented 
Europe, that is those of Modernity. According to Ortega, aboye all Europe is 
science. 
It might be interesting to recall that Ortega was an early theoretician of the 
European supranationality. He pointed out how the political reality in the form of 
national independent states did not respond any more to the sociocultural and 
economic reality of Europe. Underlying this national plurality and as a result of 
multiple relationships, a common psychologicallayer has been developing which 
"Y1\/ 
, 
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was to give rise to the formatíon of fue European nation and the European 
state. 
Europc is not and will not be Ihe inter-nation because that mean s in the víew of lhe historical 
record a hollow. a vacuum and no more. Europe will be the supranalion. 
(Ortega. 1976, 238) 
Certainly, there were other currents of thought proposing similar ideas to those 
of Ortega in the beginning of the ccntury in Spain. 1 havc focused on Ortega's 
position because the scope and pervasíveness of his influence have been 
incomparable since early 1920s until today (e ven fuough he díed in 1956). His 
ínfluence was not limited to academic or political circles. It reached the public at 
large. Even today's modernising rhctoric which the socialists are using in the 
electoral campaigns could be traced to the views held by Ortega y Gasset. If we 
come down from the plane of ideas, or ideologíes, lo that of social processes, it 
might be approprialc to recollect that from the late 1950s until the early 1970s, 
millions of Spaniards were emigrating to European countries looking for work. 
Similarly, a few years later, millions of Europcans travelled as tourists to Spain. 
In both cases fue Spaniards could experiment with the comparative perception of 
the splendid European possibílity. 
In fue late 1960s and earl y 1970s, for social movements, labour, studcnts 
and the polítical opposition to the Franco regime, Europe meant freedom (la 
libertad), the referent which should be involved against the authoritarian 
Regime. Even the Regimc itself asked to be admitted to the Common Market 
at a date as carIy as 1962, taking into account Íls political and economic 
dependence. 
On the other hand, given the sociohistorical conditions so briefly portrayed, 
the formation of a strong unitary Spanish nationalism was impossible. The 
weakness of the Spanish Nation State manifested as we have seen in the year 
of 1898, and later on in the Civil War of 1936-39, had as a consequence the 
formation of a diversified and plural Spanish national identity, in which sorne 
"peripheric" nationalisms (mainly Catalan and Ba<;que) will not only appear 
as alternatives but as a negation of the Spanish national identity itself. In this 
context, Europe meant, on the one hand, the solution by dissolution of aH 
internal problems, and on the other hand, the membership which could 
¡ncrease the so much needed coHective self-esteem. It is not surprísing then 
that under these conditions resistance to the entry into the European Commu­
nity was so scarce, in spite of the restriction fuat it supposed for the agrarian 
sector, or the taríff disarmament in the industrial one. The signing of the 
Treaty was presented, and probably expcrienced symbolically by the great 
majority of the population, as a confirmatíon of an historical aspiration lo 
"Europeity" . 
Therefore, either from the perspective of fue history of ideas and social 
movemenls, of economics, or from the point of view of the mirror glass game of 
collective identities, the experience of Europe as an aspiration had to be strong 
among the Spaniards. The survey data considered in this chapter shows this. 
J 
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TABU" 7.1 Mean ratings of favourable sentirnents towards world areas or eountries* 
European Cornrnunity 3.18 3.80 6.09 
Iberoarncrica 3.00 3.52 5.81 
Eastem Europe 2.87 3.42 5.25 
Japan 2.75 3.24 4.74 
Countries of Blaek Afriea 2.73 3.20 4.80 
India 2.72 3.15 4.59 
North Arnerica (USA and Canada) 2.62 3.13 4.79 
Arah countries of North Africa (Morocco, Algería, Egypt) 2.53 3.02 4.71 
NI = 1200 N2 = 1200 N3 744 
,. In NI scores range from 4 (very favourable) to (very unfavourable) with no neutral poínt. 
In N2 seores range from 5 (very favourable) to I (very unfavourable) with 3 as neutral poln!. 
In N3 seores range from 7 (very favourable) to I (very unfavourable) with 4 as neutral poin!. 
Table 7.1 which ineludes the responses to the question "what are your 
sentiments towards each of these countries or block of countries: very 
favourable, fairly favourable, fairly unfavourable or very unfavourable?" shows 
that the most favourable sentiment seems to be for the European Community in 
all cases. AIso, when the question is put in a hypothetical way, asking "who 
would you like lo be the winner in a football match in which the European and 
Latin-American selections will face each otherT', the great majority seems to 
identify with Europe; 48% and 55% of the first and second sample respectively 
preferred Europe to win while 23% of the fírst sample and 21 % of the second 
sample preferred Latin-America to win. 
Now, if the confrontation instead of being global between continents is 
between countries, sorne of which belong to Europe and sorne to Latin-Amenca, 
the preferred country to win in the first place is a Latin-American one 
(Argentina) (see Table 7.2). 
TABLE 7.2 Preferred winner in footbalI match between the European and Latin-American 
selcctions 
First Place Second Place First Place Second Place 
Japan 10.5 8.2 Ecuador JO.3 11.3 
Hungary 2.8 4.5 Austria 8.3 8.6 
Nigeria 4.4 4.7 Hungary 4.3 6.1 
Holland 8.3 16.6 Honduras 5.9 8.9 
Algeria 2.7 5.4 Holland 10.0 17.8 
Great Britain 9.7 11.0 Argentina 32.5 15.7 
Argentina 28.5 13.0 None 8.2 8.7 
None 5.2 6.5 D.L/N.A. 20.5 23.5 
D.K./N.A. 27.3 29.2 
NI = 1200 N2 = 1200 
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TABLE 7.3 Mean ratings of liking for differenl pcoples 
Italians 6.37 5.95 6.88 
Mexicans 6.37 6.66 
Argentinians 6.31 6.25 6.69 
Japanese 5.98 5.71 5.94 
Gerrnans 5.61 5.45 6.1)9 
Russians 5.56 5.42 6.41 
Chinese 5.54 5.47 
Portuguese 5.47 5.45 6.58 
French 5.37 5.23 5.76 
North Arncricans 5.18 5.08 5.48 
Polish 5.14 6.18 
Africans 5.14 5.86 
English 4.89 4.96 5.59 
Gypsies 4.14 5.66 
Moroccans 4.12 4.10 5.20 
NI 1200 N2 = 1200 N3 =744 
To identify with Europe as a whole seems to be differcnt from identifying 
with specific countries which are part of Europe. This observarion finds 
further support in another type of question shown in Table 7.3 "who do you 
like ... the following peoples". The responses ranged from O (not at aH) to 
10 (very much). First, the similarity in rank orderings mainly in the first two 
samples which are rcpresentative of the adult Spanish population is notable. 
Table 7.3 shows that a Latin group of peopIes (ltalian, Argentinian, Mexican) 
is the most liked by the Spanish, while the Moroccans, Gypsies, English and 
North Americans are the least liked. The fact that this structure of preferences 
happens to emerge in a sample of weH-qualified and educated persons 
suggests that this is a structure of intemational attitudes quite generalised 
among the Spanish. The post positive auitudes towards the Latin, with the 
exception of Portuguese, in the two general population samples seem to 
respond to a sentiment of sympathy and perceived similarity between the 
Spanish and these peoples. The origins of these perceptions can be found in 
history. Historical factors may al so account for the relatively little liking for 
the English and North American and, to a lesser extent, for the French. It is 
obvious that European national identities have been constructed to a great 
extent through wars wíth each other; one only has to go for a walk in the 
squares, schools, museums or palaces in European countries to be reminded 
of this. Victory halls, triumphal arches, statues of generals and admirals, 
heroes of "la Résistance", all appear before us as symbols in which national 
identities have been forged and kept in the collective memory of European 
peoples. It is many years since Spaniards have had any war, with the 
exception of the Civil War. However, they seem to keep memory of those 
which they had in the past, as it seems to appear in their intemational 
.J 
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attitudes. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how peoples so admired in 
other respects are comparatively so Hule Hked. 
The Orientations towards Iberoamerica: On the Iberoamerican 
Community of Nations 
The idea of achieving a certain fonu of continental unity in Latin-America 
goes back to the same beginning8 of its independence. Bolivar envisioned 8uch 
unity in the fonu of a confederation of peoples sharing the same language, 
religion, customs and traditions. 
This imagined community by "el libertador" did not go very far in reality 
however. The newly liberated peoples had to laya new institutional base and a 
new legitimacy and reorganise their economies. The immediate and urgent 
problems left little time to the new leaders for unitary undertakings (Safford, 
1987). On the other hand, the United States of the North actively opposed any 
8uch project for a united states in the south, according to sound realpolitik 
logic. 
The rapprochement sentiment started to arise anew once the old colonial 
power, Spain, ceased to be a threat and hegemonic North America was perceived 
as a new one. So a process of rapprochement started again among the Latin­
American peoples and their old "mother country". The North American 
interventions in the area, specially when Mexico lost half of its territory in 1847, 
had created resentment towards the United States in the Peninsula as a 
consequence of the humiliation due to the war of 1898. 
Sectors of the Spanish inteIligentsia which did not share the Europeanism of 
Ortega but who fostered a re-encounter of archetypes in Spanish history as 
opposed to the modernity represented by Europe, will find in the idea ofAmerica 
and its potentíal development a way in which to reaffinu their collective identity. 
It was rediscovery which soothed wounded national sentiment; but it allowed 
also to look to the future. 
Such a mood accompanied the intensification of relations which went on until 
the end of the Republic and the beginning of the Civil War. 
After the war thousands of professionals, scientists, professors, who were on 
the republican side, went in exile to different Latin-American countries, mainly 
to Mexico and Argentina. This was a different emigration from that which went 
to America before and comprised mainly peasants and workers. The exiIe 
experience of these republicans forced them, from a situation of direct personal 
involvement, to think about the relationship between Spain and Iberoamerica, 
and to a widening of their identifications and national IoyaIties. From the 
beginning they could feel that they were not simply exiled or "desterrados" but 
"transterrados" (moved from one country to another). This is a notion put 
forward by the philosopher Jose Gaos; to express that although not in their 
country of origin, the one to which they now arrived was not alien or foreign to 
them. Because of the intellectual prestige of many of these exiles it is difficult to 
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overestimate the importance this "pilgrim Spain" has had in increasing the 
awareness and interest of the Spaniards for America (Abellan and Monelus, 
1989). 
In Spain itseIf, intellectuals and politicians of Franco's regime did not forget 
the theme of Hispanoamerica. On the contrary they used it as a central eIement 
of the Spanish national identity designed by the authoritarian ideology. With a 
fascist and nostalgically imperialist rhetoric in a first period, and later 
emphasising the traditional and Catholic values of "eternal Spain", "Mother 
country" and "Hispanicity" (Hispanidad) were spoken about as a space of 
cultural and spiritual integration constituted by a set of values which was 
opposed equally to socio-liberal materialism of the west and to Marxist 
ideology. 
This idealistic and authoritarian discourse was well tuned with the con­
servative and Populist Latin-American sectors, providing the regime with an 
international support that it so badly needed. However during this period the 
Institute of Hispanic Culture was created, designed and conceived as a state 
organisation for promoting and facilitating educational and cultural exchanges. 
Working groups of specialists in Latin-American themes were fonued and sorne 
periodicals and publications started (Rubio Cordon, 1989). With the transition to 
democracy this Institute was renamed as the Institute for Iberoamerican 
Cooperation. 
So the two ideological Spains had, at least, one thing in common: their links 
to Latin-America. 
With the commemoration of the V Centenary of 1492, America was very 
present in Spanish public opinion. Many encounters, meetings and all sorts of 
events have taken place over several years. This commemoration has been 
criticised on many grounds. Starting with the words "discover", "commemora­
lÍon", "celebration", indigenous writers and leaders have pointed out that it may 
be inappropriate to celebrate a date which implies the violent conquest and 
destruction of their culture and ancestors. The eurocentrism implied by the tenu 
discovery has also been pointed out, and other tenus like "encounter of cultures", 
"civilísations shock", "concealment" have been proposed. 
The commemoration of events of this nature, which imply a retrospective look, 
can be considered as part of a process of maintaining andlor changing collective 
identities, particularly national identities. The past may be invoked to reinforce 
communication and understanding or even for a collective mea culpa and 
expiation. All of that may have happened to different degrees during the 
commemoration of the V Centenary by Spanish society. 
One of the possible meanings of this commemoration may líe in the concept 
of the Iberoamerican Community of Nations. This is the meaning given by the 
Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea: 
"The point of departure of a Motherland of motherlands which would embrace 
all our peoples on both sides of the Atlantic dreamed of by the great leaders of 
the Hispanoamerican independence" (Zea, 1989, 204). 
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Defined in this manner the concept of this Iberoamerican Community 
expresses the wish of a project, more or less utopian, of convergence and 
integration of the Iberoamerican countries in sorne form of supranational 
organisation. Psychological!y it would imply an emerging sentiment of cultural 
aml/or political belongingness wider than that of the national states integrated in 
it. 
In recent years the concept has had more visibility and organisational 
concreteness for public opinion as a result of the institutionalisation of the 
conference of Heads of State and Government of those countries. In this context, 
in which intel!ectuals and politicians speak of the reality of a project and the 
Iproject of a reality, it may be asked to what extent it is possible to use survey data 
to examine the existence of orientations, attitudes, opinions, beliefs and 
sentiments which may be interpreted as evidence of the presence of this project 
in public opinion and ultimately in Spanish identity. 
Concerning the stated interest of the Spanish population towards different 
areas of the world, it is Europe for which they show the highest interest and, with 
much difference in the second place, Iberoamerica. We have also seen that in 
terms of favourable or unfavourable sentiments the samples show a similar 
pattern, although in this case the differences are smal!er (see Table 7.1). It is 
difficult to know the meaning of responses to questions of this type, referring to 
abstract attitudinal objects such as areas of the world or countries. But it does not 
seem an overstatement to think that higher scores reflect a certain positive 
predisposition towards these countries. It is possible that this trend does not 
imply an underlying attitude but an orientation created by the perceived 
desirability of the response in the interview situation, or other normative 
expectations. But even in this case the problem of having to account for why 
certain areas or countries-some of which have a clear historical meaning for the 
Spanish-give rise to more or less favourable sentiments stil! remains. 
On the other hand if the stated preferences for specific winners in sport 
competitions or matches may be interpreted as a form of identification, the higher 
identification with Europe seems clear in the data. This result is obvious, 
particularly if we take into account the fact that the question assumed that Spain 
was part of the European selection. However, what is worth emphasising is that 
even under these conditions more than 20% of the sample seems to prefer the 
Latin-American selection as winner. Besides, if the question is not presented in 
terms of a dilemma implying an option between two continental selections but in 
terms of specific countries the preferences are clearly in favour of the Latin­
American ones (Table 7.2). 
These survey data seem to point to a generalised sentiment of affinity or 
identification with Iberoamerica (or at least with a very significant country such 
as Argentina). Here it will suffice to remind ourselves of what happened with 
Spanish public opinion, and in Iberoamerica in general, during the war in the 
Falklands, in spite of the negative image in which the military Argentinian 
government had previously been perceived. 
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TABLE 7.4 Percentage of sample agreeing with the idea "Nowadays there is much talk about the 
possibility of organizing an Iberoamerican Community of Nations, which would integrate the 
Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries" 
Agree very much 
Agree much 
Agree 
Do not agree at all 
D.K./N.A. 
18.2 16.0 
22.1 23.0 
26.5 29.0 
10.3 10.2 
22.9 21.8 
NI = 1200 N2 = 1200 
Another body of evidence which is consistent with what I am trying to point 
out is the survey data about Spanish attitudes to the so-cal!ed economic 
immigration. In the last decade Spain has changed from being a country of 
emigration to one of immigration. There does exist justified concern about 
increasing signs of xenophobia and ethnic discrimination, sorne times with open 
expressions of violence. Three surveys about the attitude of the Spaniards 
towards immigrants show a consistent positive discrimination towards Latin­
Americans (CIRES, 1991, 1992, 1993) in comparison with the attitudes towards 
other ethnic or national groups. This is specially true among the most educated 
strata of the population. These differential attitudes would be hard to understand 
but for the fact that it can be assumed that a sentiment of belongingness or of 
inclusion in the same linguistic or historical and cultural community exists, 
transcending the dividing political and geographical lines. 
Responses to the direct question about the agreement with the idea of the 
Iberoamerican Community of nations appears in Table 7.4. Put in such a way, it 
seems difficult to disagree with. The same categories in which responses are 
codified are not symmetrical; having three steps of agreement and one of 
disagreement. Even if the respondents do not understand the question being 
posed to them it is consequently easy to be in agreement. The high percentages 
of N.R. makes one suspect such a bias. These con sideration s seem less relevant 
if they are extended to the third sample (N3) in which the university level of 
education and the social position of respondents suggest a good understanding of 
the question. In this case an analogy between the British Commonwealth and the 
Iberoamerican Community was established and they were questioned about the 
"desirability" and the "possibility" of such a community in the Spanish-speaking 
peoples. Scores could range between O (not at al!) and 10 (yes, wholly). The 
mean "desirability" for al! the sample was 7.1 which fairly coincides with general 
samples, and the mean for "possibility" was 4.3 which indicates that expectations 
about the implementation or realisation of such a community are not very 
optimistic. 
If the attempt is made to oppose the perception of Spain's membership to 
Europe or Latin-America, as it happens with the first two items in Table 7.5 we 
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TARl.E 7.5 Percentage 01' agrccment and disagreement with the notion Ihat Spain should align 
itself with Latin-Amer 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
The Ibcroamerican 
Nations is no doubt a great idea bul 
Spain is Europe and its roles are 
essentially in Europe 55.6 25.4 66.8 18.6 52.2 31.3 
Spain is geographically in Europe, 
but bccausc of its language, history 
and traditions should mainly relate 
itself to Latin-America 49.6 39.4 53.0 37.7 40.5 37.8 
Spain is Ihe mother country of 
Latin-America and Ihis role should 
prevail aboye all otber 
considerations. even eeonomic 
interests 26.7 54.1 32.2 49.7 8.1 81.0 
NI 1200 N2 = 1200 N3 =744 
can see again a general trend of a preferred orientation towards Europe. However, 
the statement that "Spain in spite of being in Europe, must relate itself mainly to 
Iberoamerica", also has considerable support. The intended problematic 
character of these two items in Table 7.5 seems to have been perceived, given the 
high overlapping in both responses. The contradiction implied in these two 
options does not seem to be experienced by the population; although in the third 
sample it holds to sorne extent (about 15% of the sample). Finding themselves in 
the dilemma of having to decide between Europe and Iberoamerica 
will go for Europe (in fact they have already done 
Nevertheless, it is also evident that the idea of a strong link with Iberoamerica 
has been, and it seems that it will be, a central reference for Spanish international 
orientations, although they do not have the perception that this aspect of their 
identity is contradictory with the other one. 
Finally it seems that those links should lose their idealistic overtones implied 
in the concept of "Mother country" (Table 7.5) and establish the links in a more 
pragmatic way. 
ConcIuding Remarks 
From survey data about international opinions and attitudes of Spaniards it is 
possible lO observe differenlial response patterns that we believe do not 
express a transíent collective mood but a more stable structure 01' 
preferences, opinions and so on, which are related to significant aspccts 01' their 
collective memory and 01' their future aspirations, that is their colJective identity 
as a nation whích, a1though in a dífferent way, is involved in two ongoing 
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processes of supranationality, Europe and Iberoamcrican Community 01' Nations. 
The European aspirations do not seem to cxclude negative recollections about its 
relationships with other European nations as the rankings on the liking 01' 
different peoples seem to indicate. The lower liking of the British and North 
American could be interpreted as an expression of an "historical resentment" 
towards the Anglo Saxon world. 
The acceptance 01' the idea 01' the Iberoamerican Community 01' Nations may 
be said to have a collective psychological foundation in: (a) a sentiment of 
affinity and belonging to a cultural and historical community, shown in the 
differential responses towards countries and peoples as well as a 
discrimination towards Latín-American immigrants and (b) an historical 
resentment to which 1 have just referred. 
The sociohistorical and psychosociological pcrspectives of these international 
orientations help us to understand the idea of an lbcroamerican Community as a 
project of supranationality, however Utopian it may be, in which the Spanish 
identity feels involved. 
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